How do we understand the widely-ignored three-year war in Sudan? Is it, as some suggest, a result of a conflict between two generals — the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader, Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan, and the leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as General Hemedti), who are fighting for control of the state? Or is it fundamentally a conflict driven by regional and international powers pursuing their geopolitical interests in the country?
It would be inaccurate to describe the war simply in terms of internal political fights or external geopolitical interests. It is, above all, an imperialist war — and one where the national and international exist in a clear relationship.
The war aims to control resources, seize land, and install local comprador elites to rule the country. The rise of regional imperialist powers such as Israel and the UAE has given these actors increasing influence across Africa’s peripheries, particularly in Sudan, and they now threaten the lives and livelihoods of tens of millions of Sudanese.
Five years of protests
The 2018 Sudanese uprising succeeded in ousting dictator Omar al-Bashir after 30 years of brutal rule. But the movement was quickly undermined by local liberals on one hand and military forces on the other.
The Western world did not support the uprising. But it did hope to replace the Islamist government with a liberal one led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok. Hamdok, it was hoped, would implement and enforce IMF policies, formalise normalisation with Israel (a process initiated by Al-Burhan), undermine or cancel any security arrangements with Russia, and push Chinese investments out of the country, granting access to transnational companies or regional comprador forces instead.
Regional capitalist regimes quickly entered the fray. States like the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others pursued their interests, seeking to gain access to Sudanese land and resources, draw Sudan away from Iran, and work to contain revolutionary energies in the country, which posed a clear and immediate threat to their interests.
The liberal wing of the Sudanese movement intentionally misled the uprising, hijacked its demands, and coopted much of its leadership. But no vanguard emerged to challenge this process. The reformist left — and the Sudanese Communist Party — failed to provide the revolutionary leadership that could live up to the sacrifices made by the people in the streets.
The Sudanese Communist Party joined the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a liberal alliance, and endorsed the constitutional declaration brokered by the US and other international and regional partners.
Like the Bashir government before it, the Hamdok government adopted a neoliberal orientation in all respects. It adopted IMF policies and neglected popular calls to establish a sovereign economy. It normalised ties with Israel. It paid $300 million to the United States as compensation for the terrorist attacks against its citizens in Africa in the 1990s. These, and other policies implemented at this time, produced widespread economic hardship, which paved the way for the military coup that followed.
Despite these setbacks, the Sudanese revolution persisted, led by revolutionary grassroots groups and the organised working class — labourers, peasants, unemployed youth, millions of war victims and displaced people who had been small producers in the country’s peripheries. By sustaining protests for nearly five years, continuing until one week before the war erupted, they threatened both the ruling class and regional and international capitalist powers. This revolutionary momentum demonstrated the political potential of Sudan’s marginalised masses. Their persistence posed a direct challenge to both local elites and imperial interests.
Two Capitalist Powers
As the uprising’s demands radicalised, splits appeared within the ruling class over how to contain the widening revolutionary movement.
Resistance committees and other revolutionary groups emerged during this period. They raised slogans calling for SAF’s removal from politics and the dismantling of the RSF. They opposed neoliberal economic policies and rejected external intervention both before and after the military coup. They also began building bottom-up organisations based on popular democratic programs.
But other factors also contributed to the war. Chief among them was the conflict between the SAF and RSF, as well as their external backers. The UAE supports the RSF, while Egypt, Turkey, Iran and others back SAF.
SAF represents and protects the old local capitalist order, supported by Islamist and rightist parties. RSF represents rising capitalist forces backed by neoliberal parties, Israel, and the UAE. These factions engaged in aggressive economic competition over gold, banks, state assets, investments, and strategic port locations. This competition accelerated the path to war.
The conflict between old and new capitalist powers has been fueled by regional imperialist ambitions, especially those of the UAE. The UAE strongly backs the RSF, which has, in turn, served imperialism’s interests beyond Sudan. The RSF fought as mercenaries in the Yemen war. It was recruited to halt migration to Europe through Libya. It sells conflict gold at discounted prices to Dubai and other regional markets in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Chad.
As the RSF’s atrocities intensified — including village invasions, genocidal violence, looting, mass displacement, and land grabbing — SAF’s reputation has improved among the population. This lends legitimacy to the war waged by the SAF leadership, which serves only to maintain their privileges.
However, we must distinguish between SAF’s commanders and the soldiers fighting the RSF on the ground.
Overlapping Contradictions
Understanding Sudan requires identifying the primary and secondary contradictions and their shifting relationships.
At the surface level, the warring parties compete over resources and power. But this is a secondary contradiction between two local capitalist forces. The deeper reality is twofold. First, this conflict reflects tensions between regional and international powers. Second, it represents a proxy war for resource extraction.
The primary contradiction lies between both warring parties and the revolutionary groups on the ground. Both military factions fear that the revolution will achieve major political and economic breakthroughs and gain popular support.
Recent history proves this. The two warring parties collaborated under Bashir’s regime, serving the interests of imperialism together. In 2019, they blocked the revolution’s advance by staging a coup against Bashir. They imposed a Western-aligned civilian-led government.
In 2021, SAF and RSF staged another joint coup, backed by regional powers and the United States. While ostensibly triggered by conflicts with Hamdok’s liberals, the coup’s fundamental purpose was to arrest the ongoing protests. These protests had challenged the transitional government’s imperialist policies.
The conflict, in simple terms, is over how to contain the revolution and maintain control of the country.
Another layer of contradiction exists among the regional and international imperialist powers themselves. They compete over resources and negotiate their distribution through deals they sponsor and local proxies implement.
SAF leadership opposes the RSF because it is backed by the UAE and other imperial powers as their instrument for achieving imperialist goals.
However, SAF leadership is not genuinely waging a liberation war against the RSF. As a reactionary force, it fights to preserve its own privileges. Those with concrete stakes in defeating the RSF are ordinary citizens: the working class, peasants facing RSF attacks, soldiers fighting on the ground, war victims, and displaced people. They have tangible interests in a genuine liberation struggle against the RSF and the powers behind it.
The Complex Task Ahead
The people of Sudan face a complex path ahead. Revolutionary groups must now fight on multiple fronts simultaneously.
At the fundamental level, they must fight against imperialism and its instrument, the RSF. At another level, they must oppose counterrevolutionary forces within the country. These include the old regime, the Islamists, and SAF leadership on one side, and the liberal-backed RSF on the other.
The revolutionary forces must recognise a crucial principle: fighting imperialism and its primary tool, the RSF, must occur alongside liberation from the reactionary SAF generals. Only by maintaining this dual opposition can the Sudanese revolution advance toward genuine transformation.
The article written by Mohammed Amin is an award-winning Sudanese journalist specialising in geopolitics and human rights issues across Sudan, South Sudan, and the wider Horn of Africa region.
